Tender Is the Night: Should Your Expert Be? by Ford, Cynthia
The Alexander Blewett III School of Law
The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law
Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings Faculty Publications
2013
Tender Is the Night: Should Your Expert Be?
Cynthia Ford
Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, cynthia.ford@umontana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings by an authorized administrator of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation




The 25th Advanced Trial Advocacy School took place in 
Missoula at the end of May.  It is an intense week-long program, 
combining excellent demonstrations of individual parts of a 
mock trial by faculty members with actual performances of 
the same components by the students in small group with 
individuated critique.  The students are both actual law students, 
who earn academic credit, and practicing lawyers, who earn 
CLE credits.  The faculty are mostly volunteers from Montana, 
selected for both their prowess in the courtroom and their 
willingness to give a week of their lives to help improve the 
quality of trial advocacy in Montana.  
This year, we were also fortunate to have a member of the 
faculty at the National College of District Attorneys, who serves 
full-time as a state court prosecutor in Memphis, Tennessee.  
This highly experienced trial lawyer was assigned to demonstrate 
the direct examination of the expert witness.  His direct began 
with the familiar foundation questions:  education, experi-
ence, publications, and teaching.  These questions, obviously, 
are meant to show that the witness is indeed an “expert” and 
therefore should be allowed to give an opinion on a subject of 
specialized knowledge, to help the jury make its final decision, 
per Rule 702.
“YOUR HONOR, I TENDER THE WITNESS AS AN 
EXPERT IN (specific field of specialized knowledge)”Heads 
snapped around the faculty side of the classroom when our 
esteemed visitor completed his foundation questions with this 
request, addressed to the presiding judge.  In the ensuing discus-
sion, the Tennessean indicated that in his state’s courts, “ten-
dering the witness” is necessary before you can proceed to the 
opinion questions.   Before the judge grants the request to treat 
the witness as an expert in the specified field, she gives oppos-
ing counsel an opportunity to voir dire the witness and then to 
object to granting expert status to the witness.  The judge will fi-
nally decide, either accepting or denying the witness as an expert 
in the specified field under Rule 702.  
In my more than 20 years of coaching the University of 
Montana Trial Team, travelling to courthouses around the coun-
try, we saw several other teams following this model.  In almost 
every one of the mock trials where this occurred, either the judge 
on the bench or the trial lawyers scoring the round informed 
the student-lawyers that “tender” of the expert was improper. 
This was rewarding to the UM coaches who had unequivocally 
forbidden our students from formally requesting that the judge 
certify the expert. Still, the practice lives on, as the Advanced 
Trial demonstration showed…
I decided to do a more lawyerly job of researching my 
strongly held belief that trial lawyers do not and should not 
formally ask the judge to certify a witness as an “expert” in his or 
her field.  This research, laid out below, includes Tennessee state 
(because that’s what triggered the issue) and Montana state and 
federal evidence law.  
IS TENDER NECESSARY AS A MATTER OF LAW?
A. TENNESSEE
Tennessee Evidence Rule
Tennessee’s rules of evidence, like Montana’s, appear to be 
based largely on the F.R.E.  Tennessee’s version of Rule 702 
(adopted in 1990) is:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will substantially assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
The only difference between this rule and M.R.E. 702 is the 
addition of the word “substantially” in the Tennessee rule.  As 
in Montana, the rule itself contains no specific requirement that 
the court certify that the witness is “qualified as an expert” before 
she shares her opinion with the jury.
Tennessee Cases
Two Tennessee appellate cases, one civil and one crimi-
nal, indicate that “tender” is not required in that state.  Tire 
Shredders, Inc. v. ERM-North Central, Inc., 15 S.W. 3d 849, 
863-864 (Tenn. Ct. of Appeals, 1999); State v. Williams, 2011 
WL 2306246 (Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals at Jackson).  
However, in a 2010 case, the Tennessee Court of Criminal 
Appeals did affirm a conviction despite the defendant’s allega-
tion that the trial judge committed error in declaring to the 
jury, both during testimony and in final instructions, that two 
witnesses were experts in their fields.  The Court agreed with the 
prosecution’s position that the federal disapproval of this proce-
dure did not govern the state courts:
State v. Barlow, W200801128CCAR3CD, 2010 WL 1687772 
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(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2010).  Thus, there are both criminal 
and civil cases in Tennessee which allow experts to give opinions 
without being “tendered” by counsel and “accepted” by the trial 
judge as experts per se, and a criminal case which appears to ac-
cept the practice without requiring it.  
Tennessee Conclusion
Even in Tennessee, a lawyer need not formally tender and a 
judge need not formally accept or certify an expert witness.  
B. MONTANA, OUR HOME
Montana Evidence Rule 702
Montana’s version of Rule 702 has not been changed since its 
adoption in 1978, and is identical to the original federal version.
Rule 702. Testimony by experts.  If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise.
Like Tennessee’s rule and the federal version, nothing in 
M.R.E. 702 deals with the process of getting the expert’s testi-
mony into evidence.  There simply is no rule-based requirement 
to “tender” or “proffer” the witness prior to asking her for her 
opinion. 
Montana Cases
There are many Montana Supreme Court cases dealing with 
various expert witness issues.  None of them overtly discuss the 
process of “tendering” an expert, either approving or disapprov-
ing of that process.  Most importantly, there is no Montana case 
which requires a formal proffer and acceptance of the expert wit-
ness before she gives her opinion.
The issue of overt tender and acceptance might have been 
raised and resolved in a 2005 criminal appeal involving the 
admissibility of testimony from handwriting experts.  The trial 
judge allowed the expert to testify about his comparisons of the 
handwriting on various threatening documents, using overhead 
projections and blow-ups of trial exhibits.  The trial judge also 
allowed the expert to give the ultimate opinion that the defen-
dant was the author of the threatening documents.  The Montana 
Supreme Court affirmed on both claims, and then observed:
Although the District Court did not specifically 
rule that Blanco qualified as an expert, Cheryl did not 
object to his testimony for lack of qualification. This 
Court does not address issues raised for the first time 
in this Court. State v. White Bear, 2005 MT 7, ¶ 10, 
325 Mont. 337, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 516, ¶ 10. We decline to 
address this argument.
State v. Clifford, 2005 MT 219, 328 Mont. 300, 308, 
121 P.3d 489, 495. 
The Court did not indicate further whether a specific ruling 
that a witness is qualified as an expert is necessary, but my review 
of other cases did not find any case directly so holding.
In a 2003 case, the Court began its analysis with a recap of the 
general requirements for expert testimony:
¶ 11 We begin our analysis of evidentiary 
rulings pertaining to expert witness testimony with the 
recognition that the determination of the qualification 
of an expert witness is a matter largely within the 
discretion of the trial judge and such a determination 
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
In re Custody of Arneson–Nelson, 2001 MT 242, 307 
Mont. 60, 36 P.3d 874. Additionally, we note that 
expert opinion testimony is subject to several caveats. 
Under Rule 702, M.R.Evid., opinion evidence from a 
qualified expert is admissible if specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue. Such expert testimony 
requires that a proper foundation be established. 
Expert testimony must also satisfy the relevancy 
rules set forth in Article IV of the Montana Rules of 
Evidence. Moreover, full disclosure during discovery 
under Rule 26, M.R.Civ.P., is designed “to eliminate 
surprise and to promote effective cross-examination 
of expert witnesses.” Hawkins v. Harney, 2003 MT 58, 
¶ 21, 314 Mont. 384, ¶ 21, 66 P.3d 305, ¶ 21 (citation 
omitted).
Christofferson v. City of Great Falls, 2003 MT 189, 
316 Mont. 469, 473, 74 P.3d 1021, 1025.  
Turning to the expert testimony at the trial below, the Court 
observed: “The parties presented the necessary foundation to 
qualify these medical professionals as experts in their field and 
the court accepted both Drs. Knapp and Watson as experts.  … 
both parties’ expert witnesses presented extensive testimony and 
both parties were allowed to fully cross-examine the other party’s 
expert. Additionally, the District Court instructed the jury that 
they were not bound by either expert’s opinion and that they were 
to determine the weight to be given to each expert’s testimony 
based upon the expert’s qualifications and credibility. Under 
these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the District Court 
abused its discretion.” (emphasis added) 2003 MT 189, 316 Mont. 
469, 473-74, 74 P.3d 1021, 1025.   Notably, the Court did not pro-
vide any information about the exact process of this “acceptance,” 
or indicate whether or not the parties in fact formally “tendered” 
their experts.
In the Christofferson case, in addition to the two medical doc-
tors who were the subjects of above passage, there was an offer of 
testimony from the two EMTS who responded to the plaintiff’s 
911 call about the decedent’s chance of survival at the time they 
arrived at the home.  The trial court had not allowed them to give 
their opinions; on appeal the Supreme Court affirmed:
We conclude that the opinions Neff and Songer 
gave as to the likelihood of resuscibility had they 
arrived earlier could not be based on common 
knowledge, general experience or scene observation, 
but rather required extensive specialized training and 
experience. As a result, their testimony fell within the 
realm of expert testimony requiring foundation, and 
preclusion of it as lay opinion was not an abuse of 
discretion.
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Christofferson v. City of Great Falls, 2003 MT 189, 
316 Mont. 469, 484, 74 P.3d 1021, 1031.  
The opponent moved in limine to exclude the witnesses’ 
opinions, so the trial judge was not called upon before the jury to 
certify—or not—the witnesses’ expertise.  This is far preferable to 
the “tender” process because it occurs prior to the seating of the 
jury. 
In another case, decided in 2001, the Court used the term 
“acceptance” of the expert:  “[We conclude the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in accepting the qualifications of 
Dr. Schultz to testify as an expert witness.”  State v. Clausell, 
2001 MT 62, 305 Mont. 1, 7, 22 P.3d 1111, 1116.  However, 
the procedural background laid out earlier in the case does not 
indicate that there was either any specific tender or any specific 
certification of the witness as an expert.  Instead, the State offered 
a pathologist’s testimony, and the defendant asked to voir dire, 
then objected on the basis of foundation.  The Court simply ruled 
on that objection, overruling it:
¶ 19 During its case-in-chief, the State offered 
the expert testimony of Dr. Dwayne Schultz. In 
seeking to establish his qualifications as an expert, 
Dr. Schultz testified that he was board certified in 
Pathology and that he had conducted over four 
hundred autopsies, approximately forty of which 
involved gunshot wounds. In response to voir dire 
by defense counsel, Dr. Schultz admitted he was 
not board certified in Forensic Pathology. Clausell’s 
attorney then asserted the following objection: “I 
would object to this Doctor’s testimony regarding 
Forensic Pathology which would include discussions 
about homicide cases....” The District Court overruled 
the objection and Dr. Schultz testified, among other 
things, as to the cause of Trottier’s death, the presence 
of soot and powder burns in her skull and brain, the 
trajectory of the bullet through her skull and brain, 
and the probable orientation of the gun when it was 
fired in order for the bullet to achieve its trajectory. 
Clausell did not object further to any of Dr. Schultz’s 
testimony.
State v. Clausell, 2001 MT 62, 305 Mont. 1, 5-6, 22 P.3d 
1111, 1115.  This is an example of a good objection and voir dire 
during trial: the qualifications of the witness to give an opinion 
based on specialized knowledge were fully aired, but neither the 
lawyers nor the judge used the label “expert.”
The Supreme Court discussed a similar trial procedure, with-
out any apparent concern, in 1999:
¶ 15 Arrow also called Lawrence Botkin (Mr. 
Botkin), a mechanical engineer, to give opinion 
testimony concerning kingpin design, abuse, and 
misuse, metallurgy, and accident analysis. Appellants 
were not satisfied with the foundation laid concerning 
Mr. Botkin’s qualifications as an expert witness and 
requested permission to voir dire the witness. The 
court granted the request. After conducting voir dire, 
Appellants objected to Mr. Botkin’s testimony on 
the basis of lack of foundation. The court overruled 
the objection, stating that the jury could determine 
the weight to be afforded Mr. Botkin’s testimony. 
(Emphasis added.)
Baldauf v. Arrow Tank & Eng’g Co., Inc., 1999 MT 
81, 294 Mont. 107, 111-12, 979 P.2d 166, 170.  
It does not appear that Arrow “tendered” the engineer, or in 
any other way asked the trial judge to “certify” him as an expert.  
The trial judge’s comment that the opponent’s voir dire went to 
weight, not admissibility, is a common refrain.
In a much earlier rape case, the Court approved the trial 
judge’s ruling that the proffered prosecution expert could give 
her opinion, and specifically endorsed the judge’s method of do-
ing so:
The appellant claims that the District Court erred 
in leaving the qualification of the expert to the jury 
for determination. We disagree. After the appellant 
had objected that the witness was not qualified the 
court stated, “Well, the court is going to permit her to 
testify. If the jury doesn’t believe she is qualified—well 
that will be up to the jury to decide.” We find that 
the District Court made the determination that the 
witness was qualified when it permitted the witness 
to testify. The District Court stated afterwards that 
the jury could determine the degree of the witness’s 
qualification as an expert and weigh the testimony 
accordingly. This is proper. The degree of a witness’s 
qualification affects the weight rather than the 
admissibility of the testimony. Little v. Grizzly Mfg. 
(Mont.1981), 636 P.2d 839, 843, 38 St.Rep. 1994, 
2000. We hold that the District Court did not err in 
allowing this witness to testify. (Emphasis added).
State v. Berg, 215 Mont. 431, 433-34, 697 P.2d 
1365, 1367 (1985).
Montana Conclusion
A Montana lawyer, in state court, need not formally tender 
and a judge need not formally accept or certify an expert witness.  
The cases appear to support my own observation that Montana 
lawyers and judges avoid formal tender and acceptance, so that 
the Montana practice already conforms to the standards I discuss 
below.  The few changes I suggest below to articulate this practice 
should not be difficult to implement.
C.  FEDERAL COURTS
FRE 702
FRE 702 has been amended twice since its initial promulga-
tion in 1975.  It now reads2:
RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERT 
WITNESSES
A witness who is qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
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understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or 
data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles 
and methods to the facts of the case.
Like the state rules discussed above, the language of F.R.E. 
702 discusses the substantive foundation requirements but 
not the process for demonstrating that these have been met 
before adducing the expert’s opinion.  However, the Advisory 
Committee Note to the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 specifi-
cally identifies the “tender and accept” process as problematic, 
although it was not outlawed per se by the amendment:
The amendment continues the practice of the 
original Rule in referring to a qualified witness as an 
“expert.” This was done to provide continuity and 
to minimize change. The use of the term “expert” 
in the Rule does not, however, mean that a jury 
should actually be informed that a qualified witness 
is testifying as an “expert.” Indeed, there is much 
to be said for a practice that prohibits the use of the 
term “expert” by both the parties and the court at 
trial. Such a practice “ensures that trial courts do 
not inadvertently put their stamp of authority” on 
a witness’ opinion, and protects against the jury’s 
being “overwhelmed by the so-called ‘experts.’” Hon. 
Charles Richey, Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial 
Effect of the Use of the Word “Expert” Under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in Criminal and Civil Jury 
Trials, 154 F.R.D. 537, 559 (1994) (setting forth 
limiting instructions and a standing order employed 
to prohibit the use of the term “expert” in jury trials).  
(Emphasis added)
The ABA’s Updated Civil Trial Standards (discussed later) 
quote from this ACN as support for Trial Standard 14, which 
prohibits the tender/accept process before the jury.
U.S. SUPREME COURT
There is no direct guidance from the Supreme Court on 
whether experts must, or may, be tendered before giving their 
opinion testimony.  Both of the two U.S. Supreme Court land-
mark cases (Daubert and Kumho Tire; see above) on expert 
testimony were decided on summary judgment and thus were 
about the admissibility of affidavits from experts; no “tender” at 
trial occurred, so the cases do not discuss that process.3   
THE COURTS OF APPEALS
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits squarely reject the practice of 
tender and acceptance of experts.  The Sixth Circuit recently con-
sidered an appeal from a drug-trafficking conviction where the 
trial did include an overt tender of the prosecution witness as an 
“expert” and “acceptance” by the trial judge in front of the jury:
Officer Dews then was permitted to testify as an 
expert that the activity that he observed constituted 
drug trafficking:
MR. OAKLEY [AUSA]: And, Your Honor, we 
would ask that the witness be identified as an expert 
in the identification and behavior of street-level 
narcotics trafficking.
THE COURT: Mr. Cohen?
MR. COHEN: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Officer Dews will 
be accepted as an expert in the area of street-
level narcotics transactions and behaviors that 
accompany that activity.  (Emphasis added)
United States v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 690, 694 (6th Cir. 2007).  
Because the defendant did not object to this expert testimony at 
trial, his appeal on this ground was decided under the plain error 
doctrine.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of the 
expert testimony but took the opportunity to register its disap-
proval of the tender/acceptance process:
We pause here to comment on the procedure used 
by the trial judge in declaring before the jury that 
Officer Dews was to be considered an expert. Other 
courts have articulated good reasons disapproving of 
such practices, with which we agree. See, e.g., United 
States v. Bartley, 855 F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir.1988) 
(noting that “[s]uch an offer and finding by the 
Court might influence the jury in its evaluation of 
the expert and the better procedure is to avoid an 
acknowledgment of the witnesses’ expertise by the 
Court”); State v. McKinney, 185 Ariz. 567, 917 P.2d 
1214, 1233 (1996) (observing that “[b]y submitting 
the witness as an expert in the presence of the jury, 
counsel may make it appear that he or she is seeking 
the judge’s endorsement that the witness is to be 
considered an expert.... In our view, the trial judge 
should discourage procedures that may make it 
appear that the court endorses the expert status 
of the witness. The strategic value of the process 
is quite apparent but entirely improper”). When 
a court certifies that a witness is an expert, it lends 
a note of approval to the witness that inordinately 
enhances the witness’s stature and detracts from 
the court’s neutrality and detachment. “Except 
in ruling on an objection, the court should not, 
in the presence of the jury, declare that a witness 
is qualified as an expert or to render an expert 
opinion, and counsel should not ask the court to do 
so.” ABA Civil Trial Practice Standard 17 (Feb.1998); 
see also Jones, Rosen, Wegner & Jones, Rutter Group 
Practice Guide: Federal Civil Trials & Evidence 
§ 8:1548.1 (The Rutter Group 2006). Instead, the 
proponent of the witness should pose qualifying 
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and foundational questions and proceed to elicit 
opinion testimony. If the opponent objects, the 
court should rule on the objection, allowing the 
objector to pose voir dire questions to the witness’s 
qualifications if necessary and requested. See Berry 
v. McDermid Transp., Inc., 2005 WL 2147946, at 
*4 (S.D.Ind. Aug.1, 2005) (stating that “counsel for 
both parties should know before trial that the court 
does not ‘certify’ or declare witnesses to be ‘experts’ 
when ‘tendered’ as such at trial. Instead, if there is 
an objection to an offered opinion, the court will 
consider the objection. The court’s jury instructions 
will refer to ‘opinion witnesses’ rather than ‘expert 
witnesses’ ”); see also Jordan v. Bishop, 2003 WL 
1562747, at *2 (S.D.Ind. Feb.14, 2003). The court 
should then rule on the objection, “to the extent 
practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence 
from being suggested to the jury by any means.” 
Fed.R.Evid. 103(c). (Emphasis added).
United States v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 690, 697-98 (6th 
Cir. 2007).  
(Three state cases have declined to follow this aspect of the 
Johnson case4 but the large majority of cases which cite Johnson 
on this point do so with approval.)  See, also U.S. v. Kozminski, 
821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1987), aff’d in part and remanded in part, 
487 U.S. 931, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988) (“Although 
the practice is different in some state courts, the Federal Rules 
of Evidence do not call for the proffer of an expert after he has 
stated his general qualifications. In Kozminski, this court coun-
seled against putting some general seal of approval on an expert 
after he has been qualified but before any questions have been 
posed to him. The issue with regard to expert testimony is not 
the qualifications of a witness in the abstract, but whether those 
qualifications provide a foundation for a witness to answer a 
specific question.”)
In U.S. v. Bartley, 855 F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1988), the ap-
pellant alleged error in the prosecution’s failure to proffer as, and 
the trial court’s failure to make a specific finding that the witness 
was, an “expert.”  He contended that this process violated both 
F.R.E. 702 and his Confrontation right. The conviction stood:
Although it is for the court to determine whether 
a witness is qualified to testify as an expert, there 
is no requirement that the court specifically make 
that finding in open court upon proffer of the 
offering party. Such an offer and finding by the 
Court might influence the jury in its evaluation of 
the expert and the better procedure is to avoid an 
acknowledgement of the witnesses’ expertise by 
the Court. This court, therefore, finds no error in 
the admission of the testimony of Mr. Wagenhofer 
and the analytical report and exhibits identifying the 
presence of cocaine in the substance obtained from 
Bartley.  (Emphasis added).
United States v. Bartley, 855 F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 
1988). 
The Fifth Circuit considered an appeal in which the alleged 
error was the judge’s comment to the jury that the witness was 
not testifying as an expert.  It did not directly decide whether the 
comment was error, but did cite to Johnson in its discussion and 
held that if there was error, it was not grounds for reversal:
The Government objected to Talley providing 
expert testimony, arguing that Talley’s expertise in 
accounting was not relevant to whether Sepeda’s 
investigation was adequate. The district court 
sustained the objection and advised the jury as 
follows:
“Members of the jury, yesterday right before the 
break, the government had made an objection to Mr. 
Talley’s testimony concerning certain accounting 
principles. The court sustains the government’s 
objection. Mr. Talley will be testifying, however, he 
will not be testifying as an expert based upon the four 
accounting principles that you heard testified about 
yesterday.”…
Ollison argues that the district court’s instruction 
“degraded” Talley’s testimony by stating that Talley 
was not an expert. She observes that the district court 
did not give a similar instruction regarding Sepeda’s 
opinion testimony.
Because the district court was ruling on the 
Government’s objection, we find that the error, if 
any, was harmless. See United States v. Johnson, 488 
F.3d 690, 697-98 (6th Cir.2007) (“Except in ruling on 
an objection, the court should not, in the presence of 
the jury, declare that a witness is qualified as an expert 
or to render an expert opinion, and counsel should 
not ask the court to do so.”) (citation omitted). … The 
district court’s instruction did not “degrade” Talley’s 
testimony because both Talley and Sepeda testified 
as lay witnesses and gave their respective opinions. 
(Emphasis added)
United States v. Ollison, 555 F.3d 152, 163-64 (5th Cir. 
2009).  
The Johnson reference appears to be favorable, but this is at 
most a lukewarm adoption of the Johnson prohibition against la-
beling witnesses as “experts” (or not); I hesitate to base a catego-
rization of the Fifth Circuit on this issue on this language. 
In the Third Circuit, another district court judge refused an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, where the defense counsel 
did not object to qualifying the witness before the jury.  Again, 
the Court of Appeals recognized the Johnson case:
Napoli then contends that his counsel erred by 
not objecting when the court stated that Schwartz 
qualified as an expert in narcotics and code language 
in front of the jury. Napoli contends that Schwartz 
should have been qualified as an expert outside of 
the presence of the jury because the court may have 
appeared to endorse Schwartz by stating in front of 
the jury that he was permitted to testify as an expert.
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At least one court outside of this circuit has 
disapproved of counsel performing voir dire of an 
expert witness in the presence of the jury. See United 
States v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 690, 697 (6th Cir.2007). 
That said, the cases which Napoli cites from within 
this circuit do not prohibit a court from qualifying 
an expert in the presence of the jury. See Schneider 
v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir.2003); Bruno v. 
Merv Griffin’s Resorts Int’l Casino Hotel, 37 F.Supp.2d 
395, 398 (E.D.Pa.1999). Moreover, the government 
offered to conduct the voir dire outside the presence 
of the jury, but Napoli’s counsel stated that voir dire 
typically occurred in front of a jury and so should 
in this case. This accordingly appears to have been a 
strategic decision of counsel. (Emphasis added.)
United States v. Napoli, CRIM.A. 07-75-1, 2012 WL 
4459584 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2012).
The Tenth Circuit also obliquely addressed this issue, in an 
en banc decision affirming the in limine exclusion of a defense 
expert in the insider trading prosecution of a Qwest executive:
Though Mr. Nacchio’s expectation that Professor 
Fischel’s admissibility would be established after he 
took the stand may have been reasonable, see, e.g., 
Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 215 F.3d 
1083, 1087 (10th Cir.2000), Mr. Nacchio had no 
entitlement to a particular method of gatekeeping 
by the district court. Indeed, Mr. Nacchio’s 
purported entitlement is squarely at odds with the 
directive in Kumho Tire that “[t]he trial judge must 
have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular 
case how to go about determining whether particular 
expert testimony is reliable.” 526 U.S. at 152, 119 
S.Ct. 1167. The district court’s failure to proceed as 
Mr. Nacchio anticipated does not by itself constitute 
an abuse of discretion.11 See id. (“The trial court must 
have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to 
test an expert’s reliability, and to decide whether or 
when special briefing or other proceedings are needed 
to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides 
whether or not that expert’s relevant testimony is 
reliable.”). (Emphasis added).
United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1244-46 
(10th Cir. 2009). 
In Nacchio, the judge granted a motion in limine to exclude 
the expert testimony, so there was neither foundational testimo-
ny on the stand nor any formal tender in front of the jury. 
I have not been able to find any Ninth Circuit decision 
specifically commenting on the tender/acceptance method of 
qualifying expert witnesses.  However, there is a published deci-
sion from the U.S. District Court for Arizona, located in the 
circuit, on point.  The case was a habeas case, decided in 2009.  
The defendant alleged, inter alia, that the Arizona state court 
judge’s “conferring of expert witness status” violated his right to 
due process and a fair trial.
The claim refers to the prosecutor’s practice of 
submitting certain witnesses as experts in their fields; 
after laying a foundation for the witness’s expertise, 
the prosecutor stated that he “submitted” the witness 
as an expert. Defense counsel did not object when this 
occurred, and the court made no comment beyond 
telling the prosecutor that he “may proceed.”
McKinney v. Ryan, CV 03-774-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 2432738 
(D. Ariz. Aug. 10, 2009).  This same claim had been raised on 
direct appeal.  The Arizona Supreme Court disapproved of the 
process but, as in U.S. v. Ollison, supra, did not find it to be the 
error to be reversible: 
The witnesses’ testimony concerned technical and 
scientific subjects beyond the common experience of 
people of ordinary education. Thus, we find no abuse 
of discretion in the judge’s admission of the witnesses’ 
opinion testimony.
We do not recommend, however, the process of 
submitting a witness as an expert. The trial judge 
does not decide whether the witness is actually an 
expert but only whether the witness is “qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education ... [to] testify ... in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise.” Ariz.R.Evid. 702. By submitting the 
witness as an expert in the presence of the jury, 
counsel may make it appear that he or she is seeking 
the judge’s endorsement that the witness is to be 
considered an expert. The trial judge, of course, does 
not endorse the witness’s status but only determines 
whether a sufficient foundation has been laid in terms 
of qualification for the witness to give opinion or 
technical testimony. See United States v. Bartley, 855 
F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir.1988) (“Although it is for the 
court to determine whether a witness is qualified to 
testify as an expert, there is no requirement that the 
court specifically make that finding in open court 
upon proffer of the offering party”).
In our view, the trial judge should discourage 
procedures that may make it appear that the court 
endorses the expert status of the witness. The 
strategic value of the process is quite apparent but 
entirely improper. Suppose, as is frequently the 
case, there are two experts with conflicting opinions. 
Is the trial judge to endorse them both or only one? 
In our view, the answer is neither. The trial judge is 
only to determine whether one or the other or both 
are qualified to give opinion or technical evidence. 
“Such an offer and finding [of expert status] by the 
Court might influence the jury in its evaluation of 
the expert and the better procedure is to avoid an 
acknowledgement of the witnesses’ expertise by the 
Court.” Id. Thus, we disapprove of the procedure 
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followed in this case. (Emphasis supplied).
State v. McKinney, 185 Ariz. 567, 585-86, 917 P.2d 
1214, 1232-33 (1996).  
The federal district court in the habeas case agreed, holding 
“the irregularities with which the expert testimony was intro-
duced did not affect the fundamental fairness of Petitioner’s trial. 
Petitioner does not contest that the witnesses were experts by 
virtue of their experience and training and that their testimony 
was admissible.”  McKinney v. Ryan, CV 03-774-PHX-DGC, 
2009 WL 2432738 (D. Ariz. Aug. 10, 2009).
Another state court in the Ninth Circuit has approved a trial 
judge’s refusal to state before the jury that a particular witness is 
an “expert”:
The circuit court denied Plaintiffs’ requests to 
qualify Dr. Bretan as an expert. The circuit court 
also denied Plaintiffs’ request to qualify Nurse 
Carol Best as an expert, stating, “Inasmuch as this 
Court does not comment on the evidence and 
announce whether or not a particular witness is 
qualified as an expert in a particular field, the Court 
respectfully denies the request.” …it appears that it 
was the circuit court’s practice to not make findings 
before the jury as to the qualifications of any expert 
witnesses. Although the record on appeal does not 
contain an explanation of that practice, we note that 
the parties signed a pretrial conference order dated 
March 14, 2006 which states as follows under “other 
topics”: “Expert witnesses (no need to qualify).” Also, 
Defendants did not move the circuit court to qualify 
any of their witnesses as experts. Moreover, the 
circuit court ruled in limine that Dr. Bretan was not 
precluded from giving expert testimony as to cause 
of death at trial, but that Plaintiffs would need to 
establish a sufficient foundation for his opinion at that 
time. Thus, although there is nothing in the record 
explaining the court’s approach toward qualifying 
expert witnesses, it does not appear that the court 
was singling out Plaintiffs in applying its policy or 
expressing hostility toward them, or their witnesses. 
Nor can we say from the record before us that the 
circuit court’s approach to qualifying expert witnesses 
constituted an abuse of discretion.
In reaching that conclusion, we do not suggest 
that the circuit court was required to take the 
approach which it took, but rather that it was not an 
abuse of discretion for it to do so. While the concerns 
identified in note 12 supra are legitimate, they can 
also be addressed by other means, such as by giving 
cautionary instructions to the jury regarding the 
weight to be given to testimony by expert witnesses. 
See United States v. Hawley, 562 F.Supp.2d 1017, 
1036 (N.D.Iowa 2008) (noting, with regard to 
concerns about a court referring to a witness as an 
expert, that “such potential prejudice can be avoided 
by instructing jurors on the way in which they are 
to determine what weight to give to a purported 
‘expert’s’ opinion”) (citation omitted). Such 
instructions are consistent with the principle that  
“[o]nce the basic requisite qualifications are 
established, the extent of an expert’s knowledge of 
the subject matter goes to the weight rather than the 
admissibility of the testimony.” Larsen, 64 Haw. at 
304, 640 P.2d at 288 (citations omitted); Commentary 
to HRE Rule 702 (“The trier of fact may nonetheless 
consider the qualifications of the witness in 
determining the weight to be given to the testimony.”) 
(Citation and footnotes omitted).
Barbee v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 119 Haw. 136, 154-55, 
194 P.3d 1098, 1116-17.
Federal Conclusion
In federal court in some circuits, a lawyer may not formally 
tender and a judge may not formally accept or certify an expert 
witness.  In other circuits, the practice has not been outlawed but 
is not required.  The Ninth Circuit has not yet definitively ruled 
on this issue.
WHAT IS WRONG WITH TENDERING A WITNESS TO 
BE FORMALLY ACCEPTED BY THE COURT AS AN 
EXPERT?
Many secondary authorities have criticized, the practice of 
tendering an expert for acceptance or certification by the court 
at trial, in the presence of the jury.  This was one of the subjects 
of the ABA’s original Civil Trial Practice Standards, adopted in 
1998.  The ABA website explains the purposes of those standards:
They recommend procedures and otherwise 
furnish guidance that is not available elsewhere and 
are designed to foster and ensure a fair trial in both 
state and federal court.
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/policy/
civil_trial_standards.html  (accessed June 26, 2013).  
Those standards were recently reviewed and revised; the 
current version, known as the “Updated Civil Trial Standards,” 
was adopted by the ABA Section in August 2007.  The 
Updated Standards are available in .pdf format at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/
litigation/ctps.authcheckdam.pdf
The Preface to the Updated Standards states:
These Updated Civil Trial Practice Standards have 
been developed as guidelines to assist judges and 
lawyers who try civil cases in state and federal court. 
The Updated Standards address practical aspects of 
trial that are not fully addressed by rules of evidence 
or procedure. They are not intended to be a substitute 
for existing evidentiary or procedural rules but rather 
to supplement and operate consistently with those 
rules. The Updated Standards are predicated on the 
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recognition that, in an era of increasingly complicated 
evidence and litigation, there are methods for 
enhancing jury comprehension and minimizing jury 
confusion that merit wider consideration and use. 
(Emphasis added).
Section 14 of the Updated Civil Trial Standards deals with the 
process of qualifying expert witnesses:
PART FOUR: EXPERT AND SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE
14. “Qualifying” Expert Witnesses. The court 
should not, in the presence of the jury, declare that a 
witness is qualified as an expert or to render an expert 
opinion, and counsel should not ask the court to do 
so.
As with the FRE and the MRE, the drafters of the Updated 
Standards provided “Comments” to supplement each standard.  
Although “The accompanying commentary has not been 
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates and, as such, should 
not be construed as representing the policy of the Association” 
Ioriginal  emphasis],they are helpful in understanding the stan-
dards.  The Comment to Standard 14 states, in part:
It is not uncommon for a proponent of expert 
testimony to tender an expert witness to the court, 
following a recitation of the witness’s credentials and 
before eliciting an opinion, in an effort to secure a 
ruling that the witness is “qualified” as an expert in 
a particular field. The tactical purpose, from the 
proponent’s perspective, is to obtain a seeming 
judicial endorsement of the testimony to follow. It 
is inappropriate for counsel to place the court in 
that position.
A judicial ruling that a proffered expert is 
“qualified” is unnecessary unless an objection is 
made to the expert’s testimony. If an objection is 
made to an expert’s qualifications, relevancy of expert 
testimony, reliability or any other aspect of proffered 
expert testimony, the court need only sustain or 
overrule the objection. When the court overrules an 
objection, there is no need for the court to announce 
to the jury that it has found that a witness is an 
expert or that expert testimony will be permitted. 
The use of the term “expert” may appear to a jury 
to be a kind of judicial imprimatur that favors the 
witness. There is no more reason for the court to 
explain why an opinion will be permitted or to 
use the term “expert” than there is for the court 
to announce that an out-of-court statement is an 
excited utterance in response to a hearsay objection. 
(Emphasis added).
The Comment quotes from both the Advisory Committee 
Note to the 2000 Amendment to F.R.E. 702 (laid out in the F.R.E. 
section of this column) and from an article which that Advisory 
Committee Note cited as well: 
As United States District Judge Charles R. Richey 
has observed in a related context, “It may be an 
inappropriate judicial comment ... for the court to 
label a witness an ‘expert.’” Hon. Charles R. Richey, 
Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the 
Use of the Word “Expert” Under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury Trials, 154 F.R.D. 
537, 554 (1994). The prejudicial effect of this practice 
is accentuated in cases in which only one side can 
afford to, or does, proffer expert testimony.
Professor Stephen Saltzburg, who was a member of both the 
ABA original and updated Task Forces on Civil Trial Standards, 
published an article in Criminal Justice magazine in 2010, in 
which he addressed just this issue.  Prof. Saltzburg hits the nail 
on the head so I simply replicate his language here:
Long ago, I wrote in Criminal Justice magazine 
about the problems when judges anoint experts and 
explained why it is unnecessary and unwise for jurors 
to be told that the judge has “qualified” a witness as an 
“expert.” (Testimony from an Opinion Witness: Avoid 
Using the Word “Expert” at Trial, 9 Crim. Just. 35-38 
(Summer, 1994).) The American Bar Association’s 
Civil Trial Standards agree:
14. “Qualifying” Expert Witnesses. The court 
should not, in the presence of the jury, declare that a 
witness is qualified as an expert or to render an expert 
opinion, and counsel should not ask the court to do 
so….
If judges simply rule on objections to testimony 
by sustaining or overruling them and permitting lay 
witnesses to offer permissible opinions under Fed. 
R. Evid. 701, expert witnesses to offer permissible 
opinions under Fed. R. Evid. 702, and dual witnesses 
to offer both lay and expert opinions, there is no 
reason for a trial judge to qualify a witness as an 
expert and no reason for the judge to instruct the 
jury on the dual roles that a witness plays. If the jury 
is not told that a witness is an “expert,” it can judge 
the totality of the witness’s testimony for what it is 
worth….
The reality is that the process of tendering a 
witness and an expert and having the court find the 
witness to be an expert is problematic in all cases… 
(Emphasis added). 25-Fall Crim.Just. 32, 34-35.  
My particular favorite secondary source on federal trial 
practice is Wright and Miller.  Here is what they say about the 
procedure to be employed in presenting expert testimony:
Rule 702 does not require that courts employ any 
specific procedure for receiving evidence concerning 
expert qualifications. Normally a trial court will hear 
qualification evidence before permitting the witness 
to give opinion testimony. That hearing may take 
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place either in the presence or absence of the jury, at 
the discretion of the court.  Before the court rules on 
whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert, 
the opposing party should be afforded an opportunity 
to conduct a voir dire examination of the witness 
concerning the witness’s qualifications.
In some jurisdictions the practice is to proffer 
the witness as an expert after eliciting evidence as 
to his credentials. This proffer precipitates a ruling 
from the court as to whether the witness is qualified 
to testify as an expert. This procedure is not 
mandated by Rule 702. The trial court need not and 
often should not make a finding before the jury that 
a witness is qualified to testify as an expert since 
such a finding might induce the jury to give too 
much weight to the witness’s testimony. In addition, 
it is often premature for a court to find a witness 
qualified to testify as a expert even after that witness’s 
credentials have been fully presented. This is because, 
until specific questions are posed to the witness, the 
court cannot know if the witness is qualified as an 
expert in the area of inquiry.
Even after a judge has permitted a witness to 
testify as an expert, cross-examination concerning 
the witness’s qualifications should be allowed so that 
the jury may properly weigh the witness’s testimony. 
(Footnotes omitted; emphasis added)
§ 6265 General Rule—“Qualified as an Expert”, 29 
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 6265 (1st ed.)
All of these authorities agree: as a matter of policy, both 
lawyers and judges should refrain from using the term “expert” 
when referring either to a witness or her testimony.  Instead, the 
recitation of the witness’ qualifications, and voir dire and cross-
examination by the opponent, should suffice to help the jury 
assign the proper weight to be given to the witness’ opinions.  
ANOTHER ISSUE TO CONSIDER: SHOULD 
LAWYERS BE ALLOWED TO ASK AN EXPERT 
WHETHER SHE HAS EVER BEEN QUALIFIED TO 
TESTIFY IN ANOTHER COURT PROCEEDING?
This issue is tangential to the main subject of this article, but 
worth considering as well.  I agree with the conclusion of the 
authors of an article in the Review of Litigation, which discusses 
this question in depth:  
A prior witness’s knowledge, proficiency, and 
experience should be assessed when considering 
whether he or she is qualified to testify as an expert. 
Evidence that judges in other cases deemed the 
witness to be an expert, however, is inadmissible 
hearsay and opinion evidence. The presentation 
of this evidence is simply an effort to support the 
witness in a way that is often unduly prejudicial…. 
accordingly, the questionable questions regarding an 
expert’s prior qualification and/or disqualification 
simply should be forbidden. (Emphasis added).
Irving Prager & Kevin S. Marshall, Examination of 
Prior Expert Qualification and/or Disqualification-
(Questionable Questions Under the Rules of 
Evidence), 24 Rev. Litig. 559, 579 (2005).
WHAT SHOULD MONTANANS DO?
Montana should follow the preferred practice of omitting 
any “expert” stamp on a particular witness or testimony in a 
jury trial.  Because most Montana lawyers and judges already do 
so, this recommendation should not cause any great difficulty.  
However, because lawyers from other jurisdictions do appear 
here pro hac vice, or move here permanently, Montana should 
affirmatively and clearly voice its agreement with ABA Updated 
Civil Trial Standard 14.
The Comment to the ABA Updated Civil Trial Standard 14 
ends with some practical advice which instructs both advocates 
and judges on how to comply:
This Standard suggests that the court should 
not use the term “expert” and that the proponent 
of the evidence should not ask the court to do so. 
The party objecting to evidence also has a role to 
play in assuring that the court does not appear to be 
anointing a witness as an “expert.” A party objecting 
that a witness is not qualified to render an opinion or 
that a subject matter not the proper subject of expert 
testimony should avoid using the word “expert” 
in the presence of the jury. Any objection in the 
presence of the jury should be “to the admissibility of 
the witness’ opinion.” If the objecting party objects 
that testimony is inadmissible “expert” testimony 
and the court overrules the objection, it may appear 
that the judge has implicitly found the witness to 
be an “expert.” When an objection is made, if the 
proponent wishes to argue the matter, it should be 
outside the hearing of the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 103 
(c ) (providing that inadmissible evidence should not 
be heard by the jury).
The Montana Supreme Court
The Montana Supreme Court should clearly adopt Standard 
14 of the ABA Updated Civil Trial Standards for all state trials.  
The best way to do that is to amend the Uniform District Court 
Rules5 by adding a new rule entitled “Procedure for Qualifying 
Experts.”  Additionally, UDCR 5, “Pre-trial Order and Pre-trial 
Conference” should be amended to add a similar provision into 
the required form for the Pre-trial Order.  The Comment to the 
ABA Updated Standard 14 contains helpful suggestions.  
Based on those, I suggest that a new UDCR read as follows:
Procedure for Qualifying Experts.  In a jury trial, 
neither the court nor the lawyers should, in the 
hearing of the jury, use the term “expert” in referring 
to any witness, testimony, or opinion.  The proponent 
of such evidence should not ask the court to do so, 
EXPERT, from previous page
EXPERT, next page
Page 30 June/July 2013
for instance by “tendering” the witness as an “expert” 
or asking the court to “accept” or “certify” the witness 
as an expert. The party objecting to evidence on 
the basis that the witness is not qualified to render 
an opinion or that a subject matter not the proper 
subject of expert testimony should not use the word 
“expert” in the presence of the jury. Any objection 
in the presence of the jury should be “to foundation” 
or “to the admissibility of the witness’ opinion.”  The 
lawyers and judge may use the term “Rule 702” in 
argument and ruling before the jury, but not the title 
of that rule nor any language from it which refers to 
“experts.” 
This rule does not apply to motions, hearings, or rulings out-
side the hearing of the jury.
UDCR 5(c) should also be amended to add a section to the 
Pre-Trial6 Order, so that every litigant is informed of the correct 
procedure prior to trial and knows she may be subject to sanc-
tions for violation of a court order for non-compliance:
Treatment of Expert Witnesses.  No party shall, 
in the presence of the jury, request that a witness be 
declared, certified, accepted or otherwise recognized 
as “an expert.”  No party shall, in the presence of 
the jury, refer to any testimony as “expert.”  Such 
witnesses and testimony may be called “opinion 
witnesses” and “opinion testimony.”  
Alternatively, the Court could indicate in its next case involv-
ing expert testimony that henceforth Montana will follow the 
ABA Updated Trial Standard 14. 
Montana Pattern Jury Instructions
The benefits of the practice of not labeling particular wit-
nesses or testimony as “expert” will be lost if the jury instructions 
themselves do not comply.  As Professor Saltzburg et al observed:
The utility of the Standard can be undermined if 
the court is not careful to excise the term “expert” 
from the instructions it gives to the jury before it 
deliberates. Juries can be fully instructed on their role 
in assessing credibility without any mention of the 
term. The following instruction is illustrative:
Some witnesses who testify claim to have special 
knowledge, skill, training, experience or education 
that enable them to offer opinions or inferences 
concerning issues in dispute. The fact that a witness 
has knowledge, skill, training, experience or education 
does not require you to believe the witness, to give 
such a witness’s testimony any more weight than that 
of any other witness, or to give it any weight at all. It 
is important for you to keep in mind that the witness 
is not the trier of fact. You are the trier of fact. It is 
for you to decide whether the testimony of a witness, 
including any opinions or inferences of the witness, 
assists you in finding the facts and deciding the issues 
that are in dispute. And, it is for you to decide what 
weight to give the testimony of a witness, including 
any opinions or inferences of the witness.
6 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin, & 
Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 
144 ((8th ed. 2002) .
The current (2009) version of the Montana Criminal Jury 
Instructions do use the term “expert:”
INSTRUCTION NO. [1-113]
[Expert Witness]
A witness who by education and experience has 
become expert in any art, science, profession or 
calling may be permitted to state an opinion as to a 
matter in which the witness is versed and which is 
material to the case, and may also state the reasons 
for such opinion.  You should consider each expert 
opinion received in evidence in this case and give it 
such weight as you think it deserves; and you may 
reject it entirely if you conclude the reasons given in 
support of the opinion are unsound.
This could be easily amended by simply removing the word 
“expert” and substituting in the first sentence “has gained spe-
cialized knowledge.”  (While we are at it, shouldn’t it be “by edu-
cation OR experience?” See M.R.E. 702).  The second sentence is 
even easier: just omit “expert” and retain “opinion.”  
Similarly, the Montana Civil Pattern Jury Instructions need 
tweaking to excise the term “expert.”  Civil Pattern Instruction 
1.12 now reads:
A witness who has special knowledge, skill, 
experience, training or education in a particular 
science, profession or occupation may give his/her 
opinion as an expert as to any matter in which he/
she is skilled.  In determining the weight to be given 
such opinion you should consider the qualifications 
and credibility of the expert and the reasons given for 
his/her opinion.  You are not bound by such opinion.  
Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it 
entitled.
This instruction could be fixed easily by simply deleting the 
first bolded phrase, and for the second bolded phrase substituting 
“the witness” for “the expert.”
Civil Pattern Instruction 3.06 is entitled “Professional 
Negligence—Expert Testimony—When Not Required.”  It 
instructs:
The testimony of an expert is ordinarily required 
to establish the appropriate standard of care owed by 
a doctor to his/her patient.  However, the law permits 
an exception where you, as lay persons, are able to say 
as a matter of common knowledge and observation 
that it is plain and obvious that the injury the patient 
has establish could not have been sustained if due care 
had been exercised.
I do not think this pattern instruction needs to be amended 
globally, because it is sets forth the substantive requirement for 
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expert testimony, rather than describes a particular witness as an 
expert.  Further, this instruction normally is used in the absence 
of an expert, rather than where one has testified.  However, 
courts and counsel should consider changing the language if the 
circumstances of the individual case mean that the instruction 
might be construed to violate Updated Civil Trial Standard 14.
Montana District Courts
The Montana District Courts should include in their Local 
Rules provisions which mirror the suggested UDCR amend-
ments above, at least until such time as the UDCR are amended 
(and afterwards, if the UDCR truly do govern only civil cases).  
Additionally, each trial judge should include in all his or her Pre-
Trial Orders similar language so that the parties are aware of the 
trial judge’s adherence to this practice in his or her courtroom.  
The court should forbid the tender of expert witnesses in front 
of the jury, and should refuse to accept or certify any witness as 
an “expert.”  Thus, the judge’s role is to assess and rule on any 
foundation objections raised when the expert with specialized 
knowledge is asked for his or her opinion.
Lastly, the court should ensure that its jury instructions do 
not undo the good obtained by the trial process.  The quotation 
from Professor Saltzburg et al, set forth in the earlier discussion 
about Pattern Jury Instructions, should be implemented imme-
diately, even before the Pattern Instructions are amended.  This 
is the language they suggest:
Some witnesses who testify claim to have special 
knowledge, skill, training, experience or education 
that enable them to offer opinions or inferences 
concerning issues in dispute. The fact that a witness 
has knowledge, skill, training, experience or 
education does not require you to believe the witness, 
to give such a witness’s testimony any more weight 
than that of any other witness, or to give it any weight 
at all. It is important for you to keep in mind that 
the witness is not the trier of fact. You are the trier of 
fact. It is for you to decide whether the testimony of 
a witness, including any opinions or inferences of the 
witness, assists you in finding the facts and deciding 
the issues that are in dispute. And, it is for you to 
decide what weight to give the testimony of a witness, 
including any opinions or inferences of the witness.
6 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin, & 
Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 
144 ((8th ed. 2002).
Montana Lawyers
A. Motion in Limine to Exclude a Listed Expert
Montana lawyers, in both state and federal court, should 
attempt to resolve disputes about the admissibility of expert 
testimony under Rule 702 before trial, through motions in li-
mine, if at all possible.  This process does not require the caution 
necessary when arguing this issue before the jury at trial, and has 
the even more important benefit of giving the court and parties 
enough time to carefully consider the question raised.  
B.  Objection at Trial
If, however, the motion in limine procedure is not used, 
then at trial neither the lawyers nor the judge should use the 
label “expert” at any point before the jury.  The proponent of the 
testimony should simply ask the witness the opinion question.7  
The proponent should not say to the judge “I tender/offer this 
witness as an expert in (specified field).”  
The opponent should simply object: “Objection.  Foundation, 
Rule 702” and add a request: “May I voir dire?”  The voir dire is 
a mini cross-examination, the only purpose of which is to show 
the court that this witness in fact does not meet the requirements 
of Rule 702 and thus should not be allowed to give his or her 
opinion.  Here is an example:
Q:  It is not really “Dr.”, is it, Mr. Jones?
A.  I don’t know what you mean.
Q.  Well, you never attended any medical school 
in the U.S., did you?
A. No.
Q.  And you never attended any medical school 
outside the U.S., did you?
A. No.
Q.  You do not actually have an M.D. degree, do 
you?
A.  Not yet.
Q.  And you failed the First Aid training class in 
Cub Scouts, didn’t you?
A.  Well, that was a long time ago, but yes.
Q.  You haven’t passed any First Aid training class 
since then, have you?
A.  No.
Q.  You have never been licensed as a physician in 
any state in the U.S.?
A. No.
Q.  You have never been licensed as a physician in 
any country in the world, have you?
A. No.
Q.  You have never worked in any capacity in an 
Emergency Room anywhere in the U.S.?
A. No.
Q. Nor in the world?
A. No. 
Q.  You have never once, anywhere, cared for a 
patient as an emergency room doctor, have you?
A.  No.
Q.  And you bought your scrubs on EBay?
A.  Some, and some from the hospital thrift shop.
Q. Isn’t it true that the only thing which you know 
about emergency medicine is what you have learned 
from watching the TV show “ER”?
A.  No.  I also watched “Doogie Howser.”
“Your honor, I renew my objection to this witness 
giving any opinion under Rule 702.”
Now the judge simply rules on the objection.  In this 
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example, it is obvious that the witness does not meet even the 
relaxed Daubert standard reflected in Rule 702, so the objection 
would be sustained and the witness prohibited from giving any 
opinion on the basis that he does not have the specialized knowl-
edge that would be helpful to the jury.  The judge only has to say 
“Sustained” without using the word “expert.”
If the example were less clear, so that although the witness 
did not graduate from Harvard Medical School, she did obtain 
an M.D. from the University of Mississippi and has practiced in 
an ER for a few years, the judge might let her give her opinion.  
To do so, the judge should only say “Overruled.  She may give 
her opinion” and should not go on to say “I find that she is an 
expert.”
C.  Recommended Motion in Limine to Preclude Use of 
“Expert” Label at Trial
As the authorities discussed above recognize, there is a strong 
temptation to have the judge state, before the jury, that your 
witness is an expert.  “The tactical purpose, from the proponent’s 
perspective, is to obtain a seeming judicial endorsement of the 
testimony to follow.”  Comment to A.B.A. Updated Civil Trial 
Standard 14.  If one lawyer does this, her opponent naturally will 
want to follow suit to make sure that the jury considers the other 
expert in the same light.   Mutual disarmament is the solution, 
and a procedural motion in limine is the way to do it.
A recent federal district court opinion shows how a good 
advocate can ensure compliance with the Johnson and ABA 
Guidelines by using a motion in limine:
Defendant requests that the Court issue a pretrial 
evidentiary ruling barring the Government from 
requesting in the presence of the jury that one or 
more of its witnesses be declared an expert. Defendant 
also requests that no witness be referred to as an 
expert or their testimony referenced as an expert 
opinion. Defendant asserts that such references would 
improperly invade the province of the jury to evaluate 
the evidence and weigh the credibility of the witnesses. 
Defendant relies on United States v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 
690 (6th cir.2007), in support of his argument…
United States v. Cobb, CR-2-07-0236, 2008 WL 
2120845 (S.D. Ohio May 19, 2008).  Your brief 
in support of your motion should cite the A.B.A. 
Updated Civil Trial Standard 14 as well as the cases I 
have discussed above, particularly U.S. v. Johnson.
Because I think that a good motion always includes a pro-
posed order, I suggest that you use the following language from 
the Cobb case as a template:
Therefore, in accordance with the A.B.A. Updated 
Civil Trial Standard 14 and the Sixth Circuit’s holding 
in United States v. Johnson, Defendant’s Motion is 
GRANTED. The Court will act in accordance with the 
instruction as set forth in detail in the A.B.A. Updated 
Civil Trial Standard 14 and Johnson. Further, the 
Court will instruct the jury in accordance with 
Johnson and the A.B.A. Updated Civil Trial Standard 
14.
See, United States v. Cobb, CR-2-07-0236, 2008 WL 2120845 
(S.D. Ohio May 19, 2008).  (I have added the Civil Trial Standard 
language; the Cobb case referred only to Johnson.)
CONCLUSION
I hope your nights are tender, especially these great Montana 
summer evenings, but not your witness.  Montana courts and 
lawyers can take the high road, comply with A.B.A. Updated 
Civil Trial Standard 14, and let juries assess the testimony of a 
Rule 702 witness without being blinded by the gleam of a special 
designation
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law 
where she teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.
.
ENDNOTES
1   This is the title of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s fourth and last novel, originally pub-
lished in 1934.  Fitzgerald took the title from a line in a poem by Keats 
entitled “Ode to a Nightingale.”  See, being an English major has been help-
ful…
2  The extra language in the federal version which is not in the MRE results 
from an attempt to codify the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court on 
the requirements for admission of expert testimony.  “Rule 702 has been 
amended in response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993), and to the many cases applying Daubert, including Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999).”  Advisory Committee Note to 
2000 Amendment of F.R.E. 702.
3 In Daubert, each side submitted affidavits from experts, opining on the 
causal relationship between prenatal Bendectin and birth defects.  The trial 
judge excluded the plaintiffs’ affidavits, finding that the methodology used 
by the plaintiffs’ experts did not meet the “general acceptance” standard 
of reliability.  (The Supreme Court’s decision imposed a new and different 
standard, and remanded the case).  
 
In Kumho Tire, the Court extended its Daubert analysis to engineering and 
other technical but non-scientific specialized knowledge.  The plaintiffs 
opposed the defense motion for summary judgment with deposition 
testimony from an expert in tire failure analysis, who concluded that a 
manufacturing defect in the tire had caused the blowout which injured the 
plaintiffs.  The trial judge concluded that the plaintiffs’ expert’s methodol-
ogy fell short of the Daubert standard, excluded the affidavit and granted 
summary judgment for the defense.  The Supreme Court held that the trial 
court had employed the correct standard, and did not abuse its discretion 
in excluding the affidavit as based on insufficiently reliable methodology.
4  See, Kihega v. State, 392 S.W.3d 828 (Tex.App., 2013); In re Commitment of 
Simmons, 2012 IL App (1st) 112375-U, Ill.App. 1 Dist.; State v. Barlow, 2010 
WL 1687772, *12+, Tenn.Crim.App. (2010).
5  I myself am unclear about whether the Uniform District Court Rules apply 
to all, or only civil, cases in Montana District Courts.  There is nothing in 
the UDCR themselves which addresses this issue, but they are located in 
the MCA Title 26, which is entitled “Civil Procedure.”  My intent is that the 
expert witness process be the same in both civil and criminal trials.
6  While we are at it, why is Pretrial hyphenated as Pre-Trial in this rule?
7  Under Article VII of the M.R.E., the proponent can lay out the witness’ quali-
fications and then ask the opinion question, or simply ask the opinion 
question right up front and then back it up with the witness’ qualifications 
and reasoning.  “The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference 
and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts 
or data, unless the court requires otherwise.”  M.R.E. 705. 
 
The first method is the more traditional, and leaves your opponent room 
to object on foundation grounds.  The middle, and my own personal, 
choice is to do the qualification part, then ask for the opinion, then ask for 
the reasons the witness came to that opinion, and then conclude with the 
opinion again (technically this last question is redundant under Rule 403, 
but if it’s quick, it usually works).  
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